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An Empirical Analysis of Algorithmic Trading around Earnings 
Announcements 
 
Abstract 
This study examines the impact of corporate earnings announcements on trading activity and 
speed of price adjustment, analyzing algorithmic and non–algorithmic trades during the 
immediate period pre– and post– corporate earnings announcements. We confirm that 
algorithms react faster and more correctly to announcements than non–algorithmic traders. 
During the initial surge in trading activity in the first 90 seconds after the announcement, 
algorithms time their trades better than non–algorithmic traders, hence algorithms tend to be 
profitable, while non–algorithmic traders make losing trades over the same time period. 
During the pre-announcement period, non–algorithmic volume imbalance leads algorithmic 
volume imbalance, however, in the post announcement period, the direction of the lead–lag 
association is exactly reversed. Our results suggest that as algorithms are the fastest traders, 
their trading accelerates the information incorporation process. 
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1. Introduction 
Hendershott, Jones and Menkveld (2011) show that algorithmic trades [AT] reduce private 
information and increase public information. In this paper we describe the actual process in 
which AT1 accelerate the incorporation of information. We use a unique dataset obtained 
from the Australian Securities Exchange [ASX], where price sensitive information is timely 
and exclusively released to the public during trading hours due to regulated continuous 
disclosure requirements. This study sets out to provide the first empirical evidence on 
whether AT react more rapidly to information, employ profitable trading strategies and lead 
or lag non-algorithmic traders [non–AT]. 
The traditional view in financial economics (e.g. French and Roll, 1986) is that public 
information is reflected in prices before anyone is able to trade on it. Theoretical studies by 
Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), Kyle (1985) and others on the other hand argue that private 
information is reflected in prices as a result of trading. The new algorithms active in the 
market today may potentially alter this clear distinction between public and private 
information, as fast decision making algorithms may trigger trades in the space between the 
moment when earnings are released and the moment when the information becomes public. 
While some studies investigate the connection between informed trading and high 
frequency trading HFT (e.g., Hendershott and Riordan, 2011, Brogaard, 2010, and Brogaard, 
Hendershott and Riordan, 2014), no previous study has been able to determine why AT 
would be informed.2 Ederington and Lee (1993, 1995) and Fleming and Remolona (1999) 
show that a local equilibrium price level is established very rapidly, within minutes after 
                                                            
1 In this paper we use the term AT for algorithmic trading rather than the popular term HFT for high 
frequency trading, to indicate that our data includes all trades submitted by a computer, slow and fast.  
2 Natural language processing that reads and interprets news text automatically may be one technique 
implemented making it possible for AT to respond to news arrivals quickly and in the correct 
direction with regards to the impact of the news on prices. 
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macroeconomic announcements. Erenburg, Kurov and Lasser (2006) show that in this fast 
price discovery process, local futures traders are able to react more quickly to 
macroeconomic news announcements than off exchange traders. The information contained 
in corporate earnings announcements are also reflected rapidly in prices, but less so than 
macroeconomic announcements due to post-earnings announcement drift (see Bernard and 
Thomas, 1989, and later references to them). Campbell, Ramadorai, and Schwartz (2009) 
find that institutions anticipate both earnings surprises and post-earnings announcement drift, 
indicating that there indeed is a category of investors with access to superior or private 
information around earnings releases and also that this private information is not immediately 
reflected in securities prices. 
Hence it appears that there is opportunity for algorithms to exploit mispricing and delayed 
reaction to new information within the first minutes after a public earnings release. One type 
of information-based trading that AT has the potential to do well is to detect informed 
trading. ‘Information oriented technical traders’ do not process private information, but aim 
to recognize price patterns caused by systematic mistakes by informed traders or predictable 
price impact from uninformed trades, p. 230, Harris (2003). Information oriented technical 
traders become informed when they trade based on actions by informed traders and such 
activity may become more effective with the help of fast automated trading technology. AT 
strategies are more likely to be used by traders that aim to be the first to react correctly to 
new information. It has been established that algorithms process information faster, see e.g. 
episodes when algorithms react to incorrectly published news.3 Kirilenko, Kyle, Samadi and 
                                                            
3http://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2011/10/how-well-do-financial-markets-separate-news-
from-noise-evidence-from-an-internet-blooper.html provides an example of these rare events: 
 “News moves at high speed in the digital world and high-frequency-trading robots can trade faster 
than you can blink. In combination, these two powers can move markets up or down instantaneously. 
High frequency trading robots that are used to search for news events can exacerbate the speed and 
severity of crashes if the information is false.  A particular case occurred on September 8, 2008, when 
a 2002 article about the bankruptcy of United Airlines’s parent company resurfaced on the Internet 
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Tuzun (2011) also confirm that high frequency traders aggressively trade in the direction of 
price changes. Brogaard, Hagstromer, Norden and Riordan (2015) show that those HFT 
practicing exchange members who invest in the fastest available connections reduce their 
adverse selection costs and gain market share. Biais, Foucault, and Moinas (2015) analyze the 
conditions under which the utilitarian welfare is maximized in a market where fast and slow 
traders coexist, and Brogaard, Hendershott and Riordan (2014, p. 2267) conclude that “HFTs 
facilitate price efficiency by trading in the direction of permanent price changes and in the 
opposite direction of transitory pricing errors”. The question remains, do algorithms normally 
react not only fastest but also in the correct direction when news is released? 
In this paper the information content of AT is investigated using a unique dataset where 
trades that are generated by an algorithm can be distinguished from manual and computerized 
manual order flow. The advantage of this dataset is that it enables us to differentiate the 
identity and exact originating trading terminal of each order submitted through an electronic 
order submission system, rather than having to rely on proxies like high frequency trades and 
fleeting orders (e.g., Hasbrouck and Saar (2009) and Hendershott, Jones, and Menkveld 
(2011)). Hence, the trading behavior we study is closer to the true behavior of AT than what 
has been possible in most previous studies. 
Since no previous study has investigated how AT may become informed, this paper sets 
out to investigate AT around earnings announcement events, when the probability that some 
market participants have access to private information is high (e.g., Ederington and Lee 
(1993, 1995)). We test the hypothesis that algorithms are able to time their trades better than 
non–algorithmic traders around earnings announcements as a result of their advantage in 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
and was mistakenly believed to be reporting a new bankruptcy filing by the company. This caused the 
company’s stock price to drop by 76 percent in just a few minutes before the NASDAQ halted 
trading. After the news had been identified as false, the stock price rebounded, but still ended the day 
11.2 percent below the previous day’s close.” 
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consistency and speed of execution. We investigate (a) the speed of price reaction, (b) trading 
patterns and trading profits, and (c) the lead lag relation between AT and non–AT traders 
volume imbalance (measured in 30 second intervals) during five minutes before and after 
earnings announcements.  
We find that algorithms react significantly faster to information than non–algorithmic 
traders, for example cumulative returns for both good and bad news information events 
increase significantly for AT while there is no significant change for non–AT. During the 10 
seconds post-earnings announcement that are positive surprises, the net buyer-initiated 
orderflow from AT is significantly higher while the increase in net buyer-initiated orderflow 
from non–AT is not significant. When the announcements are negative surprises the net 
seller-initiated orderflow from AT is higher, while the change in seller-initated orderflow 
from non-AT is not significant. Net buyer- initiated AT order flow reaches a maximum and is 
significantly correlated in the direction of the expected price movement between 30 and 90 
seconds after good news announcement. AT generate increasing trading profits up to 90 
seconds after announcements while non–AT generate losses during this time period. Finally 
our VAR systems of three equations also show that during pre–announcement period, non–
AT volume imbalance leads AT volume imbalance, however, in the post announcement 
period, the direction of this lead is exactly reversed. Overall, our results suggest that 
compared with non-algorithmic traders, algorithms are faster at interpreting information 
correctly and hence, AT enhances market efficiency.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data. Section 3 
presents the methodology and an analysis of the empirical results. Section 4 reports the 
information shares contributed by AT versus non–AT during pre and post earnings 
announcements and Section 5 concludes the paper. 
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2. Data 
2.1. Institutional setting 
The ASX is one of the world's top-10 listed exchange groups by market capitalization with 
a total market capitalization at A$1.4 trillion and over 2,183 companies listed in a wide array 
of industries as of the end of the investigated period in 2009. The Australian Securities 
Exchange is Australia’s primary securities exchange. The major market index is the 
S&P/ASX 200.  
The ASX operates a fully automated continuous auction trading system where traders 
enter market or limit orders.  Traders may enter, revise or cancel orders in the trading system 
from the pre-open phase commencing at 07:00; however, the trading system does not match 
orders until the market opens. An opening call auction algorithm starts at 10:00 and 
completes the opening procedure of all stocks by 10:10. Normal continuous trading follows 
the opening call auction and ends at 16:00. A closing call auction algorithm is run at 16:10 to 
establish the closing price of the day. The ASX displays its entire limit order book to both 
investors and brokers, while broker identities are anonymous pre- and post trade.  
In accordance with the continuous disclosure regulation (in the ASX Listing rules 3.1 and 
complying with the Corporations Act) all listed companies must release price sensitive 
corporate announcements to the ASX as soon as they become aware of such information. 
Hence ASX is the only channel for listed companies to release corporate announcements. 
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The trading halt policy of the ASX is governed by Chapter 17 of the ASX Listing rules4. 
The ASX rules set out that a trading halt may be imposed by the ASX, if the exchange 
receives or releases a company announcement which, in the opinion of the ASX, is market 
sensitive; or the company itself requests a trading halt from the exchange. If a trading halt is 
called, the concerned security is designated a pre-open status. Pre-open is the period before 
an opening call auction, during which orders may be placed but trades cannot be executed. 
The duration of trading halts are usually 1 hour for takeover announcements and 10 minutes 
for other announcements. The halted stock begins trading after the pre-open phase starting 
with an opening call auction that is aimed to maximize volume with minimum surplus (see 
ASX Market Rules, 2013 and Frino, Lecce and Segara, 2011). 
2.2 Sample selection and identification of algorithmic trades 
A unique dataset is obtained from the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) for the period 
October 27, 2008 to October 23, 2009. The data include security, date, time (to the nearest 
millisecond), price, volume, and an indicator on whether the current trade is buyer- or seller- 
initiated5 for all equity transactions at the ASX. Important for this study, the dataset contains 
an indicator for whether the current trade is initiated by a computer algorithm, which enables 
us to precisely differentiate between electronic trades classified as AT and non-electronic 
trades classified as non-AT.6 
                                                            
4 Refer to ASX Listing Rules, available at http://www.asx.com.au/regulation/rules/asx-listing-
rules.htm (Accessed on April 26, 2016). 
5 Trade initiation is classified based on information about whether a buy or a sell order caused the 
trade execution. 
6 Our data were generated from the original data tape recording the output directly from the central 
execution engine of the ASX, and contain all information about transactions and trading processes on 
the ASX equities markets. The ASX classifies each trading terminal that connects with the exchange 
execution engine into electronic or human terminals, depending on whether orders submitted from 
this terminal are generated automatically by a machine or entered by a human trader. There is one 
exception for retail traders that use online brokerage firms. In this case the ASX receives these retail 
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Company announcements during the investigated period are obtained from Thompson 
Reuters Data Scope database. Normal ASX trading hours are from 10:00 am to 4:00 pm. 7 In 
order to evaluate the trading behavior around the earnings announcements, we require the 
announcement time to fall between 11:10 am and 3:00 pm to allow at least one hour of 
continuous trading around the event. This selection process results in sample of 403 on 
market announcements by 265 companies. We further remove stock observations with less 
than 20 trades during a day, and companies not included in the S&P ASX 200 index8 from 
our sample. The final sample contains 166 earnings announcements by 101 different 
companies. If an information release is considered market sensitive the exchange imposes a 
trading halt around the information release, we analyze the trading leading up to and after the 
trading halt in the case of a trading halt and the trading leading up to and after the event in the 
case of no trading halt. 
The call auction after the trading halt is designed to help market participants process the 
new information better and hence reduce excess price volatility; however, its effectiveness is 
questionable. For example, evidence provided by Lee, Ready, Seguin (1994), Corwin and 
Lipson (2000) and Christie, Corwin and Harris (2002) for the US markets, Kryzanowski, and 
Nemiroff (2001) for the Canadian markets, Kim, Yague and Yang (2008) for the Spanish 
markets and Frino et al. (2011) for the Australian markets unanimously suggests that spreads 
and volatility are higher after trading halts. This suggests that at the very least prices do not 
reach a new equilibrium immediately after the halt, which provides an ideal experimental 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
orders as machine generated. For our study, trading terminals of all major retail brokers are identified 
and re-classified as human terminals. 
 
7 The ASX follows a staggered opening process, where stocks are opened alphabetically in groups. 
The opening phase usually ends at 10:10 am after which all stocks are in the normal trading phase, 
until the market enters a pre-close phase at 4:00 pm. 
8 S&P ASX200 companies are used because it has been shown that institutional traders (the main 
users of algorithms) are mainly focusing on large liquid stocks. For example Hendershott et al. (2011) 
show that AT improves liquidity particularly in large stocks. 
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opportunity for us to examine the relative trading behavior of AT and non-AT in reaction to 
new information both for event with and without a trading halt.  
Panel A of Table 1 presents daily statistics for number of trades, trade size and volume of 
AT initiated buy and sell trades, and Panel B of Table 1 reports daily statistics for number of 
trades, trade size and volume of non–AT initiated buy and sell trades. We observe three 
interesting patterns: (1) AT initiated trade size on both buy and sell side during 
announcement days are smaller than the trade size of non–AT initiated buy and sells trades. 
For example, the mean of trade size of AT initiated buys is about 7,378.58 which is only 
equal to 30 % of non–AT initiated buys. This result confirm that AT often trade smaller size 
in order to minimize the price impact of their trades; (2) Number of algorithmic trades 
(trading frequency) in both buy and sells sides are much higher than number of non–AT. For 
instance, the mean of number of AT initiated sells is 843 and the mean of  number of non–AT 
initiated sells is 196; and (3) On both the buy and sell side, AT–initiated volume is nearly 
twice larger than the non–AT initiated volume. These empirical results confirm that traders 
who use AT do this at high frequency with smaller trade size which generates larger trading 
volume around earnings announcements. 
<Insert Table 1 about here> 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the number of trades, trade size and volume in 
eight five minute time intervals during one hour pre and one hour post earnings 
announcements. The four five minute time intervals before the announcements are (–20,–15), 
(–15,–10), (–10,–5) and (–5, 0) and the four five minute time intervals after the 
announcements are: (0,5), (5, 10), (10,15) and (15 ,20) non overlapping minutes in relation to 
the earnings release. Panel A and Panel B presents descriptive statistics for AT and non–AT 
initiated buy trades one hour before earning announcements. Panel C and Panel D present 
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descriptive statistics for AT and non–AT initiated sell trades one hour after earnings 
announcements. The third column of Panels A to D report the differences in means and 
medians of the descriptive statistics between AT and Non-AT for each time intervals. We 
find most of these differences are statistically significant at 1% percent.9 The direction is 
determined by the quote rule and all results are reported separately for buy initiated trades 
and sell initiated trades. Several interesting results emerge in Table 2. For buy trades, AT 
initiated trading volume decreases from 478,490.17 in the (-20, -15) time interval to 
250,325.08 in the (–5, 0) time interval. AT initiated volume then increases to 884,689.99 in 
the (0, 5) time interval and again decreases to 596,459.52 in the (15, 20) time interval. This 
pre and post AT volume behavior on the buy side is consistent with the hypothesis that 
discretionary liquidity traders will decrease their trading volume as time draws closer to the 
announcement, as they are concerned with the increase in adverse selection component in 
their trading cost due to increased information asymmetry. In consequence they increase their 
trading immediately after the earnings announcement, as the adverse information cost is 
reduced due to the release of information. (see Chae (2005) and George et.al (1994)). 
We find the volume initiated by AT on the sell side during pre and post announcements is 
very similarly distributed to the buy trading volume initiated by AT. As earnings releases 
typically trigger AT activity in one direction, buyer-initiated volume is dominated by AT 
activity during positive surprises and seller-initiated volume is dominated by AT activity 
during negative surprises. 
Non-AT initiated buy volume on the other hand increases from 413,610.56 in the (-20, -
15) to 529,885.48 in the (–5, 0) time interval. Non-AT volume falls in the first five minute 
interval after the announcement (0, 5) to 292,841.16 and increases to 817,227.65 in the 
                                                            
9 Kruskal-Wallis and Wilcoxon signed rank tests are used to test the differences in mean and median 
between AT and non-AT descriptive statistics (i.e. the number of trades, trade size and trading 
volume) respectively. 
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second five minute interval. We find the lowest buy volume initiated by non-AT is 
413,610.56 in the (–20, –15) interval pre announcement and the largest buy volume is 
975,753.66 in the (15, 20) interval after the announcement. These results confirm that the AT 
initiated buy volume distribution is systematically different from the buy volume initiated by 
non–AT during one hour before and the hour after announcements and that the largest 
number of trades initiated by AT occurs in the first five minutes and that the largest number 
of trades initiated by non–AT occurs in the fourth five minutes interval after the earnings 
release. Hence the trading frequency of AT increases immediately after information release 
indicating that AT participants process information quickly and exhibit faster speed of 
execution in comparison to non–AT participants. 
<Insert Table 2 about here> 
 
2.3 Classification of announcements as good news or bad news 
We classify observations into a subset of good news announcement if the forecasting error of 
announcement is equal or above one standard deviation from the mean of the forecasting 
error (Actual Earnings Per Share (EPS) - Median Forecast EPS) distribution. An observation 
is classified into bad news subset if the forecasting error of the announcement is equal or 
below one standard deviation from the mean of the forecasting error distribution. The 
analysts’ earnings forecasts and actual earnings data are sourced from the Institutional 
Brokers Estimate System (IBES). Cross-section of market participants data are recorded to 
collect their forecasts regarding the following week’s earnings announcements. The median 
of collected forecasts serves as an estimate for the market expectations of the upcoming 
releases. We collect quarterly actual earnings and median earnings forecasts and calculate a 
standardized surprise as follows: 
13 
 
Actual EPS - Median Forecast EPS
Surprise
Standard deviation [Actual EPS - Median Forecast EPS]
  (1) 
By using the one standard deviation criteria we focus on announcements that are either 
significantly positive or negative surprises compared to the mean of the forecasting error 
(Actual EPS - Median Forecast EPS) distribution. Although the normal practice is to use 
observations that fall outside two standard deviations, we employ one standard deviation in 
order to retain as many observations as possible in our sample, while still focusing on 
significant deviations from the forecasted EPS. If the surprise ratio is greater than one 
standard deviation we classify news as good news, if the surprise ratio is less than one 
standard deviation we classify the news as bad news. From 122 announcements, 66 
announcements are classified as good news and 56 are classified as bad news. 
 
3. Empirical Results 
The empirical results section consists of three subsections. In first section, we examine the 
speed of price reaction of AT versus non–AT to good news and bad news in a five minute 
event-window centered at the earnings announcement. In the second section, we investigate 
trading patterns (measured by order flow10) and trading profit during before and after 
announcements in order to determine whether algorithmic traders are able to time their trades 
better than non-algorithmic traders. In the third section we use three equations of a vector 
autoregressive system to examine the temporal relation between trading activity (measured 
by volume imbalance11) of AT, non–AT and market returns before and after earnings 
announcements. 
                                                            
10 Order flow is measured as number of buys minus number of sells.  
11 Volume imbalance is measured as buy volume minus sell volume. We control for firm differences 
with a market capitalization control and firm fixed effects. 
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3.1. The Speed of price reaction to earnings announcements 
To examine the speed of the reaction to news, cumulative average returns (CARs) and 
cumulative adjusted average returns (CAARs) are calculated in a five minute event–window 
centered at the earnings announcement. We investigate the CARs and CAARs separately for 
good and bad news announcements to check for asymmetry in the price response. 
We define an event window starting at - and ending at , where the window covers the 
period -5 minutes to  5 minutes around the earnings announcement and return is calculated 
each ten second interval. Hence - = -30 and  =30. 
We first compute the Ri,j,k  return for  i th firm, j th time position in the window [- ,] and kth 
announcements. In the next step, we compute ,i jR  average return for ith firm over the number 
of Nh  announcements where h=1 for the good news and 2 for bad news. 
                                     , , ,
1
1/
hN
i j h i j k
k
R N R

                                                                          (2) 
In the third step, we aggregate the average return cross–sectionally ,i jR  for all firms in the 
sample becomes  
                                  ,
1
1/
hm
j h i j
i
AR m R

                        (3) 
The cumulative average return at time [ 30,30]k    is    
                                ( 30,30)
30
k
j
j
CAR AR



                         (4)  
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We use the same procedure to calculate cumulative average abnormal returns. The only 
difference is that we calculate abnormal return for ith firm, j th time and k th announcement is 
to replace R i ,j,k return by  
                                       , , , , ,i j k i j k j kAR R R                            (5) 
where ,j kR  is the return of the ASX 200 index on jth time point and k th announcements. The 
cumulative average abnormal return is:  
 
                          ( 30,30)
30
k
j
j
CAAR AAR



 
                                      (6)
 
where jAAR   is average abnormal returns at the j
th time point  and [ 30,30]k   . 
 
If the cumulative adjusted average returns (CAARs) are positive it suggests that the 
sample outperformed the index during earning announcements; if the CAARs are negative it 
means that the sample underperforms the index during earning announcements. 
 
Figure 1a and 1b present the cumulative average returns [CARs] and cumulative average 
adjusted returns [CAARs] in a Five minute event-window centered at the earnings 
announcement. To check for asymmetry in the price response, CARs are examined separately 
for good and bad news announcements. During the pre-earnings announcements period, 
CARs for AT and non–AT appear to be relatively flat when compared to cumulative average 
returns post-earnings announcement. CARs for AT associated with good news peak at 150-30 
0 seconds after the announcement and do no longer increase 300 seconds after the event. The 
CARs for AT associated with bad news decrease immediately after the announcement 
bottoming out 100 seconds after the announcement. Cumulative average returns associated 
with bad news hence appear to react faster than good news. CARs for non–AT do not reveal 
any apparent differences pre– and post– earnings announcement. CAARs exhibit similar 
results to the ones reported for CARs, also indicating a slower reaction by AT to good news 
16 
 
compared to bad news. The effect of good news appears to carry on beyond the 300 seconds 
after the announcement Overall these results suggest that the initial price reaction for AT is 
faster than the price reactions for non–AT. 
<Insert Figure 1a and 1b about here> 
 
 
 
3.2 Trading patterns and estimated trading profits  
We examine whether AT have the ability to time their trades better than non-AT12. The order 
flows are calculated as the number of trades bought minus the number of trades sold.  A 
positive order flow suggests that more than half of all trades traded in that interval by the 
specific trader type were bought. Similarly, a negative order flow suggests that the specific 
trader type tended to be on the sell side in that particular time interval. More specifically, we 
examine whether algorithmic traders are able to trade in the same direction as prices are 
expected to move, based on the classification of good or bad news. 
Erenburg  et al (2006) points out that a positive (negative) order flow for  good news (bad 
news) may be driven, at least in part, simply by the AT causing the price change and not due 
to their correctly predicting price changes. To ensure the robustness of the results and to test 
whether the trading strategy followed by algorithmic traders is profitable we calculate trading 
profit before and after announcements. 
                                                            
12 Erenburg et.al (2006) examine order flows patterns to detect whether market makers have the  
ability to time their trades better than other traders in trading S&P 500 index futures and E-mini 500 
index futures.  
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We define trading profit for a trade at time t as follows: 
( )t t t t tProfit D RP P Q   (7) 
where tRP  is the reference price, tP  is the trade price, tD  is an indicator variable equal to one 
for buys and minus one for sells, tQ  is the trade size
13.  The reference price is calculated as 
the average trade price during the sixth minute after the announcement.  We use price as the 
benchmark because based on order flow results the trading strategy used by algorithmic 
traders after the announcement appears to be very short-term.  
In this section the order flow and trading profit are examined to determine the ability of 
AT and non–AT to time their trades. More specifically, to examine whether AT  and non–AT  
are able to trade in the same direction as prices are expected to move,  based  on the 
classification of the earnings announcements as good or bad news.  
Table 3 reports the order flows of AT and non–AT pre- and post- earnings announcement. 
Statistically significant results are identified using two–tailed test. Post-earnings 
announcements, AT order flow associated with good news show a significant order flow at 
1% level during the first 10 seconds and AT order flow associated with bad news show 
significant results for the periods 0 to 10 and 10 to 20 seconds with a significance level of 5% 
and 10% respectively. Order flow for AT associated with good news reaches a maximum and 
significant order flow at 1% level in the direction of the expected price movement between 
30 and 60 seconds after the announcement. This can be interpreted that AT are net buyers 
immediately after the good news announcements and net sellers immediately after the bad 
news announcements. The order flow pattern is less pronounced for non–AT, where most of 
the order flows are not statistically significant.  
                                                            
13 We follow Erenburg et.al (2006) to calculate trading profits for each trade in each examined time 
interval after the announcement. Chakravarty and Li (2003) use a similar approach to estimate trading 
profits in futures markets.  
18 
 
<Insert Table 3 about here> 
Figure 2 shows the volume imbalance that is calculated as buy volume – sell volume for 
AT and non–AT in a five minute event-window centered at the earnings announcement. The 
event time (earnings announcement time) is defined as time 0.  The AT volume imbalance 
associated with good news and bad news are relatively flat pre-earnings announcement. Post-
earnings announcement AT volume imbalance associated with good news increases 
immediately after the announcement and reaches a maximum by approximately 90 seconds. 
It takes about 5 minutes for volume imbalance to return to normal levels. Volume imbalance 
for AT associated with bad news decreases shortly before earnings announcement and 
sharply decreases immediately after the announcement.  Non–AT volume imbalance for good 
(bad) news increases (decreases) accordingly but to a less extent than that of AT. 
<Insert Figure 2 about here> 
Table 4 reports trading profits pre- and post- earnings announcement. These profits are the 
average profit per trade and hence the economic significance in the aggregate is significant. 
Consistent with order flow, the cumulative profit for AT reverts from negative to positive 
around 30 seconds after the announcement. AT profit increases most up to 90 seconds after 
the announcement and remains positive but starts to decline after 90 seconds post. The 
cumulative non–AT profit is increasingly negative leading up to the announcement and 
remains negative. This can be interpreted as evidence that AT incorporate new information 
faster than non–AT. Therefore, during the post announcement period, transactions by AT are 
more informative than non-AT. These results are consistent with Hendershott et al. (2011) 
who find that AT enhance the informativeness of quotes. 
<Insert Table 4 about here> 
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3.3 The temporal relation between AT and non-AT trades and market returns. 
This section examines the temporal relation of AT and Non-AT volume balance and returns 
using Vector autoregressions (VAR) during one hour around earning announcements. The 
VAR is a system of three equations in which lags of returns, AT volume imbalance and non-
AT volume imbalance are used to explain each other. We use ,Pricei tinv   (the inverse stock 
price) and ,logMCapi t  (the log of market capitalization ) as additional control variables in each 
of three equations. Our VAR system of three equations pooling cross-sectional and time 
series data in a fixed effects model is specified as follows. 
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where 
,
algo
i t
 is the 30 second imbalance for AT and ,nonAlgoi t   is the 30 second imbalance for 
non–AT for company i at time t. Imbalance is calculated as buy volume – sell volume. 
,returni t  is the 30 second return. preD  
is a dummy variable that equals 1 for the first 300 
seconds before the announcement and postD  
is a dummy variable that equals 1 for the first 300 
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seconds after the announcement.14   We use Dpre and Dpost  dummy variables  to create 
interaction terms with explanatory variables to model and test the effects of five  minutes pre 
and post of  earning announcements on temporal relation between  returns, algo and non algo  
volume imbalance (buy minus sell volume) with the  their  bench mark time period ( i.e. 
twenty five minutes before  and after the first five minutes pre and after  earning 
announcements)15  ,i td  
is a dummy variable for each company used in our fixed effects model. 
,Pricei tinv  denotes the inverse price and ,logMCapi t is the log of market capitalization. An F-
statistic is used to test the null hypothesis that all company dummy variables are equal and 
the test results are reported in the last row of the Panel E of the Table 5. 
Our volume imbalance measure is simply the buy volume minus the sell volume in each 
stock, time interval, as opposed to the OIB# and OIB$ used by Chordia et.al (2005, 2008) for 
example, who scale the imbalance by the total number of trades and dollar value traded. As 
we analyze data of high frequency, we do not find it suitable to scale the imbalance measure 
with a static denominator such as total period volume, which is expected to vary more 
between stocks than over time within stocks. Instead, the firm level market capitalization and 
the firm fixed effects in our model control for differences in trading activity and other 
unobserved heterogeneity across groups (Gormley and Matsa, 2013). Another advantage of 
our approach is that we are able to identify the effect of order imbalance separately from the 
impact of price changes. 
                                                            
14 As a robustness test a GMM model is estimated using 10 second returns and volume imbalance 
with a dummy variable indicating pre and post announcements. The results are very similar to our 
results reported in Table 5. 
15  We use a deterministic time varying coefficient model for each equation, to test and model the 
effects of earnings announcements on the intercept and coefficients of explanatory variables of five 
minutes pre and post announcement with the coefficients of corresponding variables in the benchmark 
time period. 
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We use OLS to estimate the parameters in Equation 8, 9 and 10. The Newey and West 
procedure (1987) is used to calculate consistent standard errors of regression parameter 
estimates under a serially correlated and heteroskedastic error process. 
Table 5 presents empirical results on the temporal relation between AT volume imbalance, 
non–AT volume imbalance and returns during half hour before and after earning 
announcements. In panel A, we find that the coefficients of the dummy variable of pre five 
minute announcements are not statistically significant. These results indicate that pre-
earnings announcements do not cause a significant impact on intercepts of returns, AT and 
non-AT imbalance. The coefficients of the dummy variables representing five minutes post-
earnings announcements are positive and significant for the intercepts of the returns and the 
AT imbalance equations, but not significant for the Non-AT equations. These results suggest 
that AT activity increases in the five minutes post-earnings announcement. The coefficient of 
the dummy variable Dpost in the Non–AT equation is positive but not significant, which can 
be interpreted as an indications that information leakage is not severe during the pre-
announcement period, and that the market reflects new information during the post-earnings 
announcement period. 
Panel B presents the lag relation between return, AT and non–AT imbalance during five 
minute pre-earnings announcement. In the return equation, the first lag coefficient of 
Algo*Dpre is positive and significant and the first three lag coefficients of nonAlgo*Dpre are 
positive and significant. This reveals that both AT and non–AT have positive impact on 
returns during first five minutes pre–earnings announcement. In the AT (Algo) equation, the 
coefficient of returnt-1*Dpre is positive and significant and the first three lag coefficients of 
nonAlgo * Dpre are also positive and significant. In the non–AT equation, the coefficient of 
returnt-1*Dpre is positive and significant and none of the the five lag coefficients of algo* Dpre 
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are significant. These results suggest that both AT and non–AT follow a trend chasing 
strategy in the short horizon. The observation that AT do not affect non–AT before the 
announcement and non-AT leads AT, can be interpreted as an indication that non-AT are 
more informed than AT pre-earnings announcements. 
Panel C presents the lagged association between return, AT and non–AT imbalance during 
the five minutes post-earnings announcement. In the return equation, the first three lag 
coefficients of algo*Dpost  are positive and significant and the coefficient of  nonAlogt-1* Dpost 
is positive and significant. This suggests that AT have a stronger impact on returns in the 
post–announcement period than in pre–announcement period. In the AT equation, we find 
that the coefficient of returnt-1*Dpost is positive and significant and none of the lagged 
coefficients of nonAlgo* Dpost are significant. In the non–AT equation, none of the lag 
coefficient of return* Dpost are significant. Interestingly we observe that the first two algo* 
Dpost are positive and highly significant. These results suggest that AT strongly leads non–AT 
while non–AT has no impact on AT in the five minute post–announcements period. This 
evidence indicates that AT is able to process information more efficiently and independently 
of Non–AT.  
Panel D presents the temporal relation between returns, AT and Non-AT volume 
imbalance during the normal time period not impacted by the announcement (i.e. our bench 
mark period is twenty five minutes before and after the first five minute pre- and post period 
of earning announcements). We find that the first lagged coefficient of AT is positive and 
significant in the return equation.  There is no significant lead and lag association between 
AT and Non –AT volume imbalance during this period. Empirical results show that all three 
variables have a strong auto-correlation structure.   
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Panel E presents the empirical results of control variables in each equation. All F-
statistics, reported in Panel E are significant at one percent level. These results suggest that 
we reject the null hypothesis that all company dummy variables are equal (i.e. there is a 
significant difference between the means in each equation). 
Comparing our results in section 3.2 where we examine order flow measured as the 
number of buys minus the number of sells, to the results this section where we analyze 
volume of buys minus volume of sells, we find that the results are consistent in that the 
direction of AT changes swiftly in the same direction of an earnings surprise. Based on the 
results in Section 3.2 which directly assesses the profitability of AT, each trade by an 
algorithmic trader earns an average profit of over $6,000 per earnings release during the 160 
seconds after the announcement, while non-AT makes a loss during the same period (see 
Table 4). Such short term profits translate into highly significant returns of economics 
significance in the long run. 
<Insert Table 5 about here> 
4. Robustness test: Information shares pre and post earnings announcements  
As a robustness test we use methodology from Hasbrouck (2002) to calculate information 
share ratios, 30 minutes before and 30 minutes after earnings announcements. We use the 
following vector error correction model (VECM): 
1
1
k
t t t i ti
i
p p A p 
 

      (11) 
where 
t
p  is an vector of cointegrated prices, i
A  are n n  matrices of autoregressive 
coefficients, k  is the number of lags, 1t
p

 is an ( 1) 1n    vector of error correction terms,   
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is an ( 1) 1n    matrix of adjustment coefficients, and 
t
  is an 1n   vector of price innovations. 
The VECM is estimated using log-prices and ten lags. 
The error correction term for the pricing association between AT and non-AT is 
1 11
AT non AT
t tt
p p p 
 
   . Therefore the coefficients   of the error correction term measure the 
price reaction to the deviation of the price difference between the two markets from zero. The 
greater the coefficient, the more the particular market reacts to deviations from equilibrium.  
Hasbrouck shows that the following vector moving average (VMA) model can be derived 
from the VECM : 
( )
t
p L t   (12) 
where ( )L   is a polynomial in the lag operator.  The VMA coefficients can be used to 
calculate the variance of the underlying efficient price:  
2
u
 
 
(13) 
where    is a row vector composed of VMA coefficients and var( )t . After 
transforming   into a lower triangular matrix F  by the Cholesky factorization, FF , it 
is possible to calculate the information share of the market j as:  
2
2
( )
j
t
u
F
I


  (14) 
where ( )
j
F  is the thj element of the row matrix F . This model produces estimates of 
the upper (lower) bound of the information share for the first (last) variable in the 
factorization.  
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Similar to Hasbrouck (2002) we calculate price discovery for each day separately and then 
average the resulting information shares across days. Several consecutive trades at the same 
price are removed. As the input data for the VECM analysis we use matched time series with 
one-second intervals between observations. If there is no price reported at a particular second, 
the previous available price is used. If there are several trades reported with the same 
timestamp, only the last trade price is used.  
The results of the calculation of information shares are shown in Table 5. The average 
midpoint of the upper and lower bounds of the information share ratio 30 minutes prior 
earnings announcement for AT and non-AT is 42.29% and 57.71% respectively. Whereas 30 
minutes post-earnings announcement AT increases to 65.61% and non–AT decreases to 
34.42%. These results suggest that non–AT make a dominant contribution to price discovery 
30 minutes before the earnings announcement while AT make a dominant contribution to 
price discovery 30 minutes after the earnings announcement.16  
<Insert Table 6 about here> 
5. Conclusions 
This paper examines if algorithmic trading activity contributes to the information content 
of stock prices in the period surrounding corporate earnings announcements. We use a unique 
data set from the Australian Securities Exchange, which allows us to identify trading activity 
and direction of AT versus non–AT before and after public information releases, to determine 
                                                            
16 Yan and Zivot (2010) demonstrate that the information share measures a combination of speed 
of impounding information and relative avoidance of noise. When the levels of noise differ 
greatly relative to the variation in the speed of information incorporation, the information 
share measure can lead to erroneous conclusions. Yan and Zivot (2010) suggest an information 
leadership metric, which according to simulation results by Putniņš (2013) correctly assign 
contributions to price discovery when noise levels differ in a bivariate system. In Appendix, 
we calculate and compare the information leadership for AT and non-AT trades, and our 
results are robust to this alternative measure. 
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if AT react more rapidly to information and employ profitable trading strategies in 
comparison with non–AT. We consider the following conclusions and contributions as 
important. 
(1) CARs and CAARs over a five minute event–window centered at each earnings 
announcement show that during the pre-earnings announcements period, CARs for AT and 
non–AT are insignificant when compared to cumulative average returns post-earnings 
announcements. CARs for AT associated with good news peak at 150-300 seconds after the 
announcement, and do no longer increase 300 seconds after the event. The CARs for AT 
associated with bad news decrease immediately after the announcement, bottoming out 100 
seconds after the announcement. This suggests that the initial price reaction for AT is faster 
than the price reactions for non–AT. CAARs exhibit similar results as those reported for 
CARs. 
(2) An order flow analysis show that AT are net buyers immediately after the good news 
announcements and net sellers immediately after the bad news announcements, whilst non–
AT reveals no significant results pre and post earnings announcements. The AT volume 
imbalance associated with good news and bad news is relatively neutral pre earnings 
announcements. Post earnings announcement AT volume imbalance associated with good 
news increases immediately after the announcement and reaches a maximum by 
approximately 90 seconds. Volume imbalance for AT associated with bad news decreases 
shortly before earnings announcement and sharply decreases immediately after the 
announcement. Non–AT volume imbalance for good and bad news increase and decrease 
accordingly but to a lesser extent than for AT. These results provide evidence that AT exhibit 
faster speed of execution to incorporate new information than non–AT. 
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(3) We report trading profits for AT and non–AT pre- and post- earnings announcements. 
Consistent with the order flow analysis, the cumulative profit for AT reverts from negative to 
positive around 30 seconds after the announcement. Cumulative AT profits increase up to 90 
seconds after the announcement, and remain positive but declines after 90 seconds post. The 
cumulative non–AT profits are increasingly negative leading up to the announcement and 
remain negative. This can be interpreted as evidence that AT incorporate new information 
faster than non–AT. 
(4) Our VAR system of three equations provides several interesting results: First, during 
the preannouncement period, non–AT volume imbalance leads AT volume imbalance, 
however, in the post announcement period, the direction of this lead–lag association is 
exactly reversed. This result suggests that information leakage is not severe pre–
announcement and that the market reflects new information during the post earnings 
announcement period. AT volume imbalance increases in the post earnings announcement 
period, while non–AT volume imbalance is not significantly different between the pre and 
post earnings announcement periods. Second, both AT and Non–AT activity predict positive 
market returns. Third, both the first and the second lag of market return are positively related 
to AT activity in both the pre– and the post–announcement periods, this result confirms that, 
in the aggregate, the net AT activity follows a momentum trading strategy around earnings 
announcements. 
(5) We find that the average information share of non–AT is larger than the average 
information share of AT pre-earnings announcement and the results is exactly reversed post 
announcement. These results are consistent with the results of our VAR analysis in point (4), 
that non–AT activity lead AT activity before announcements, and that the results is reversed 
that AT activity lead non–AT after announcement periods. 
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In summary, we provide new empirical evidence to suggest that computer programs 
submitting AT have the ability to process information faster than non–AT and benefit from 
fast trade execution during information release periods. Consequently, AT earn higher profits 
than non–AT because they have better market timing ability than non–AT. Our results 
suggest that AT improve market efficiency. Regulators and the public need to realize that 
algorithms make markets more efficient and are compensated for this. Hence regulation of 
algorithmic trading should deal with potential effects of fast disappearing liquidity (flash 
crashes/spikes), but it is important to note that these negative effects are offset by faster price 
discovery. 
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Appendix 
The Information Leadership Share (ILS) developed in Yan and Zivot (2010) and Putniņš 
(2013) is a combination of two established measures in the price discovery literature, i.e. the 
Hasbrouck (1995) Information Share (IS) and the Gonzalo and Granger (1995) Component 
Share (CS). Both IS and CS decompose price innovations into permanent and temporary 
components, which measure the incorporation of new information and the relative level of 
noise in the price series.    
In particular, Putniņš (2013) estimates the IS and CS metrics using the Vector Error 
Correction Model (VECM) parameters and variance covariance of the error terms as in 
Baillie et al. (2002). 
∆ , 	 , 	 	 , 	 ∑ 	 , 		∑ 	 , 	 ,            (A.1) 
∆ , 	 , 	 	 , 	 ∑ 	 , 		∑ 	 , 	 ,                (A.2) 
where ∆ , 	represents the change in the log price of the asset traded in market i for time 
period t. The component shares are obtained from the normalized orthogonal vector of error 
correction coefficients 
, 	               (A.3) 
Given the covariance matrix of the reduced form of VECM error terms 
Ω  
and its Cholesky factorisation,  Ω  , where 
0
	
0
1
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IS can be obtained as: 
	 	
	 	 	
, 	
	
	 	
 
 
Because the estimates of IS are affected by the ordering of the price series in the VECM, 
Putniņš (2013) uses the approach advocated by Baillie et al. (2002) and calculates ILS under 
each of the two possible orderings and then takes the simple average. 
,                 (A.4) 
We calculate ILS for the Algo and Non-Algo transaction pre and post earnings 
announcement. The results are reported in Table A1. 
  
33 
 
Table A1: Information Leadership Share (ILS) Pre and Post Earnings Announcement 
This table presents the Information Leadership Share (ILS) developed in Yan and Zivot (2010) and Putniņš 
(2013). 
,  
where IS, is the Information Share metric developed by Hasbrouck (1995) and CS is the Component Share 
metric developed by Gonzalo and Granger (1995)  
Variable Mean Median Std Dev 
Panel A. 30 minutes Pre Earnings Announcement 
Information Leadership Share AT 48.73% 54.06% 41.48% 
Information Leadership Share Non-AT 51.27% 45.94% 41.48% 
Panel B. 30 minutes Post Earnings Announcement 
Information Leadership Share AT 53.24% 66.68% 42.66% 
Information Leadership Share Non-AT 46.76% 33.32% 42.66% 
 
As the table shows, the average ILS for AT is smaller than that of non-AT before earnings 
announcements, and this relation reversed after earnings are announced. The median values 
of ILS are higher for AT both pre and post earnings announcements, while the median ILS 
for AT increases significantly in the post earnings announcement period. Our results are 
generally consistent with the results on information share reported in Table 6. 
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Table 1:  Descriptive statistics 
This table presents descriptive statistics for number of trades, trade size and volume on announcement 
days. Panel A and B  report daily statistics and Panel C and D  report  statistics one hour before and 
one hour after announcements for algo and non algo trades. The number of trades is the number of 
trades for each stock averaged across all stocks. Trade size is the average volume per trade for each 
stock per day, averaged across all stocks. Volume is the total volume traded in each stock per day, 
averaged across all stocks.    
 
 
 Buy Trades Sell Trades 
 
No. of 
Trades 
Trade Size Volume 
No. of 
Trades 
Trade Size Volume 
Panel A:  Daily Statistics for Algorithm-Initiated Trades 
Mean 974.50  7,378.58  8,588,194.11  843.00  9,588.86  6,062,566.18  
Median 673.00  2,306.42  1,897,604.00  542.00  2,562.37  1,698,106.00  
Std Dev 1,136.95  13,682.36  38,522,169.05  884.27  22,576.50  22,071,409.08  
Minimum 70.00  166.10  42,480.00  64.00  105.51  15,404.00  
Maximum 7,905.00  78,092.72  354,926,100.00  5,373.00 145,821.95  203,944,580.00  
Panel B:  Daily Statistics for  Non-Algorithm-Initiated Trades 
Mean 235.89  25,750.65  4,830,952.04  196.13  26,225.02  3,716,715.03  
Median 118.00  6,844.25  1,038,520.00  110.00  8,666.21  1,198,490.00  
Std Dev 322.70  64,841.42  16,893,844.37  234.68  63,363.52  11,313,249.48  
Minimum 20.00  317.14  22,642.00  20.00  282.33  10,164.00  
Maximum 2,217.00  558,206.00 135,738,210.00  1,263.00 538,223.82  87,551,424.00  
Panel C:  One Hour Pre- and Post-Earnings Announcement for Algorithm-Initiated Trades 
Mean 452.36  7, 446.22   4,141,531.67  388.75  7, 900.77 2,538,422.82  
Median 321.00  2,182.56  752,122.00  257.00  2, 482.69  736,588.00  
Std Dev 529.28  14,373.04  17,701,812.73  401.96  21, 490.12  8, 903, 150.82  
Minimum 30.00  131.96  74,424.00  20.00  226.48  43,726.00  
Maximum 3,213.00  74,914.19  123,762,950.00  2,310.00 148, 
573 83
62,401,010.00  
Panel D:  One Hour Pre- and Post-Earnings Announcement for  Non-Algorithm-Initiated Trades 
Mean 121.83  18,656.73  1,788,999.71  95.91  22,945.16  1,710,765.14  
Median 82.00  5,528.32  516,052.00  58.00  7,578.63  486,990.00  
Std Dev 137.90  27,730.21  4,080,183.83  101.89  42,732.75  4,609,693.28  
Minimum 20.00  611.70  57,580.00  20.00  486.92  25,320.00  
Maximum 837.00  125,427.33 23,699,224.00  570.00  218,307.24  31,878,456.00  
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Table 2:  Descriptive statistics (1 Hour pre- and post- earnings announcement) 
This table presents the descriptive statistics for the number of trades, trade size and volume around announcement days. Mean, median and standard deviation 
for the following five minute intervals; (-5, 0), (-10, -5), (-15, -10), (-20, -40), (-40, -60) for pre- earnings announcement and (0, 5), (5, 10), (10,15), (15, 20), 
(20, 40), (40, 60) for post- earnings announcement are reported for AT, non-AT initiated trades and the difference in these. The number of trades is the 
average number of trades, averaged per day across all stocks. Trade size is the average trade volume, averaged per day across all stocks. Volume is the total 
trade volume, averaged per day across all stocks. The differences of mean and median between AT and non-AT are tested using Kruskal-Wallis test and 
Wilcoxon test, respectively.  ***; **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% level and 10% level. 
 AT Non-AT AT – Non-AT 
Period (min) Mean Median STD Mean Median STD Mean Median 
Panel A : One hour Pre Earnings Announcement for AT and Non-AT Initiated  Buy Trades 
No. of Trades 
(-5, 0) 62.19 62.63 57.74 33.35 25.65 31.70 28.84** 36.98* 
(-10, -5) 75.98 67.96 131.18 28.75 18.15 35.00 47.23* 49.81** 
(-15, -10) 60.71 49.05 78.42 29.25 33.75 58.50 31.46* 15.30** 
(-20, -15) 82.53 125.89 79.52 27.55 34.70 64.10 54.98* 91.19** 
(-20, -40) 104.35 107.55 99.75 28.55 34.30 64.05 75.80* 73.25** 
(-40, -60) 80.75 70.90 109.50 28.05 25.95 38.50 52.70* 44.95* 
Trade Size 
(-5, 0) 4,026.93 3,931.27 1,493.49 15,888.62 16,317.69 7,945.23 - 11,861.69** -12,386.42** 
(-10, -5) 4,642.46 4,261.17 1,434.11 15,836.69 13,746.47 10,600.51 - 11,194.23** - 9,485.30* 
(-15, -10) 5,666.82 4,449.92 2,319.10 15,489.26 14,118.39 10,889.44 - 9,822.44** - 9,668.47* 
(-20, -15) 5,797.67 3,351.05 3,786.30 15,013.09 13,639.57 3,255.96 - 9,215.42* -10,288.52** 
(-20, -40) 4,705.61 3,839.89 1,985.59 15,977.18 11,175.12 19,247.88 - 11,271.57** -7,335.23** 
(-40, -60) 6,311.48 5,998.90 2,993.54 17,405.43 11,537.99 27,157.96 - 11,093.95** -5,539.09* 
        (continues) 
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AT Non-AT AT-Non-AT 
Period (min) Mean Median STD Mean Median STD Mean Median 
Volume 
(-5, 0) 250,352.08 246,214.34 86,232.14 529,885.48 418,548.71 251,863.79 -279,533.40** -172,334.37* 
(-10, -5) 352,724.06 289,596.87 188,128.99 455,304.75 249,498.42 371,017.82 -102,580.69  40,098.45 
(-15, -10) 344,053.16 218,287.50 181,871.81 453,060.83 476,495.67 637,032.14 -109,007.67 -258,208.17  
(-20, -15) 478,490.17 421,878.29 301,091.40 413,610.56 473,292.96 208,707.09 64,879.61** - 51,414.67* 
(-20, -40) 491,030.62 409,139.77 198,062.99 456,148.42 383,306.50 1,232,826.75 34,882.20 25,833.27 
(-40, -60) 509,633.69 425,322.32 327,792.91 488,222.41 299,410.90 1,045,581.55 21,411.28 125,911.42 
Panel B : One hour Post Earnings Announcement for AT and Non-AT Initiated  Buy Trades 
No. of Trades 
(0, 5) 178.55 153.10 62.65 24.94 25.35 54.50 153.61*** 127.75** 
(5, 10) 171.31 173.90 131.50 64.44 49.85 46.05 106.87** 124.05** 
(10, 15) 118.00 131.35 70.10 56.91 48.80 40.30 61.09* 82.55** 
(15, 20) 105.82 89.30 114.01 46.85 43.80 30.40 58.97* 45.50** 
(20, 40) 110.90 120.30 87.75 48.90 44.65 34.20 62.00** 75.65* 
(40, 60) 79.31 76.53 76.70 42.90 33.75 61.00 36.41* 42.78* 
Trade Size 
(0, 5) 5,011.04 4,498.87 2,405.37 11,742.89 10,568.30 2,529.80 -6,731.85** -6,069.43** 
(5, 10) 4,427.47 4,128.59 1,433.27 12,681.49 8,380.04 10,243.92 -8,254.02** -4,251.45** 
(10, 15) 5,892.44 4,832.03 2,110.47 12,208.21 12,007.87 3,821.77 -6,315.77** -7,175.84* 
(15, 20) 5,636.32 5,280.30 2,476.55 20,827.19 11,702.49 15,442.56 -15,190.87* -6,422.19* 
(20, 40) 5,645.61 4,487.10 3,079.12 16,286.91 14,447.04 10,286.64 -10,641.30* -9,959.94* 
(40, 60) 5,480.28 4,277.53 3,487.73 17,574.30 14,279.53 10,841.92 -12,094.02** -10,002.00* 
(continues) 
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AT Non-AT AT – Non-AT 
Period (min) Mean Median STD Mean Median STD Mean Median 
Volume 
(0, 5) 884,689.99 679,778.51 150,684.90 292,841.16 267,906.44 137,873.86 591,848.83*** 411,872.07** 
(5, 10) 758,476.38 717,962.49 188,474.69 817,227.65 417,745.24 471,732.34 -  58,751.27 300,217.25 
(10, 15) 695,332.92 634,687.11 147,944.09 794,751.21 685,984.05 154,017.32 -  99,418.29 -51,296.94 
(15, 20) 596,459.52 471,530.65 282,344.04 975,753.66 512,569.28 469,453.92 -379,294.14** 41,038.63** 
(20, 40) 626,098.29 539,798.65 270,192.94 796,429.99 645,060.31 351,802.96 -170,331.70 -105,261.66 
(40, 60) 435,715.56 326,940.98 267,509.09 753,937.65 481,934.04 661,357.38 -318,222.09 -154,993.06 
Panel C : One hour Pre Earnings Announcement for AT and Non-AT Initiated  Sell Trades 
No. of Trades 
(-5, 0) 70.95 75.15 59.75 33.15 25.60 39.90 37.80** 49.55** 
(-10, -5) 76.88 55.50 122.60 25.75 19.20 40.10 51.13** 36.30** 
(-15, -10) 62.59 53.30 53.62 26.55 31.25 56.15 36.04* 22.05** 
(-20, -15) 78.28 53.30 150.10 26.10 27.95 150.10 52.18* 25.35** 
(-20, -40) 106.68 112.21 134.34 24.75 28.55 79.05 81.93** 83.66* 
(-40, -60) 77.27 61.65 189.08 25.60 31.05 46.25 51.67* 30.60** 
Trade Size 
(-5, 0) 4,051.12 3,956.98 1,394.29 15,391.30 16,987.81 7,877.05 -11,340.18** -13,030.83** 
(-10, -5) 4,224.50 3,985.03 1,457.37 15,222.69 10,173.55 12,530.37 -10,998.19** -6,188.52** 
(-15, -10) 5,225.68 6,619.10 2,427.20 15,503.71 16,623.37 11,742.88 -10,278.03* -10,004.27** 
(-20, -15) 5,918.24 5,320.80 1,121.23 15,645.68 15,341.12 3,777.32 - 9,727.44* -10,020.32** 
(-20, -40) 5,268.17 5,208.47 1,739.77 16,038.92 13,039.54 15,086.85 -10,770.75* -7,831.07* 
(-40, -60) 5,940.71 5,197.20 2,860.75 17,669.28 10,583.23 29,614.94 -11,728.57* -5,386.03 
(continues) 
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AT Non-AT AT-Non-AT 
Period (min) Mean Median STD Mean Median STD Mean Median 
Volume 
(-5, 0) 283,781.01 297,367.38 83,308.58 510,221.73 434,887.85 314,294.14 -226,440.72** -137,520.47* 
(-10, -5) 324,799.89 221,169.07 178,674.09 391,984.34 195,332.19 502,467.83 -67,184.45** 25,836.88** 
(-15, -10) 327,098.56 352,798.20 130,151.88 411,623.38 519,480.44 659,354.62 -84,524.82* -166,682.24** 
(-20, -15) 463,301.36 283,598.48 168,295.95 408,352.25 428,784.37 566,976.29 54,949.11** -145,185.89* 
(-20, -40) 562,025.75 584,444.72 233,719.55 396,963.25 372,278.74 1,192,615.56 165,062.50 212,165.98 
(-40, -60) 459,044.51 320,404.26 540,904.37 452,333.54 328,609.38 1,369,691.09 6,710.97 - 8,205.12 
Panel D : One hour Post Earnings Announcement for AT and Non-AT Initiated  Sell Trades 
No. of Trades 
(0, 5) 172.07 155.30 30.15 23.08 21.16 30.15 148.99** 134.14** 
(5, 10) 168.29 145.96 176.80 58.21 46.28 90.23 110.08** 99.68** 
(10, 15) 92.17 126.67 196.72 50.20 41.80 45.30 41.97* 84.87* 
(15, 20) 96.76 116.37 116.48 43.27 42.16 29.49 53.49** 74.21* 
(20, 40) 98.20 125.45 39.55 48.85 49.65 42.00 49.35 75.80 
(40, 60) 75.90 75.25 58.80 37.30 30.40 66.00 38.60 44.85 
Trade Size 
(0, 5) 4,967.03 5,020.67 1,519.95 11,776.71 11,913.97 1,719.95 -6,809.68** -6,893.30** 
(5, 10) 4,123.72 3,950.18 1,323.55 14,136.62 12,577.06 5,257.89 -10,012.90** -8,626.88** 
(10, 15) 5,076.84 4,588.31 1034.30 12,140.75 12,214.83 2,545.95 -7,063.91** -7,626.52 * 
(15, 20) 5,402.21 4,837.42 2,067.83 20,110.40 17,713.47 10,867.27 -14,708.19** -12,876.05* 
(20, 40) 5,411.98 4,588.34 2,729.00 16,743.88 13,369.55 10,349.12 -11,331.90** -8,781.21* 
(40, 60) 5,494.54 4,550.15 2,664.75 18,117.60 16,144.35 9,219.91 -12,623.06* -11,594.20* 
        (continues) 
 
39 
 
AT Non-AT AT-Non-AT 
Period (min) Mean Median STD Mean Median STD Mean Median 
Volume 
(0, 5) 854,689.99 779,725.54 45,826.49 271,769.36 252,097.42 51,856.49 582,920.63** 527,628.12** 
(5, 10) 693,996.42 576,529.15 234,002.99 822,929.59 582,017.90 474,441.51 -128,933.17* -5,488.75* 
(10, 15) 467,933.27 581,188.79 203,471.34 609,465.88 510,580.03 115,331.63 -141,532.61* 70,608.76* 
(15, 20) 522,701.50 562,915.02 240,856.17 870,181.50 746,754.27 320,489.00 -347,480.00* -183,839.25* 
(20, 40) 531,456.70 575,607.31 107,931.93 817,938.48 663,798.08 434,662.99 -286,481.78* -88,190.77* 
(40, 60) 417,035.50 342,398.88 151,358.05 675,786.58 490,788.24 608,514.27 -258,751.08* -148389.36* 
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Table 3:  Order flow for AT and non-AT 
This table reports the total order flow within each interval for algorithmic and non-algorithmic trades 
surrounding earnings announcements. The order flow is calculated as the number of buy trades minus 
the number of sell trades. Standard errors are given in parentheses. Only announcements classified as 
good and bad news are included in the sample. *** indicates significance at the 1% level;  ** 
indicates significance at the 5% level; and * indicates significance at the 10%.  
 Good News Bad News 
Interval (unit!) AT   Non-AT AT  Non-AT  
(-300, -270) 25 
(1.92) 
6 
(1.19) 
10 
(2.43) 
6 
(0.54) 
(-270, -240) -22 
(2.43) 
5 
(0.53) 
11 
(1.25) 
2 
(0.36) 
(-240, -180) 29 
(4.52) 
9 
(1.05) 
1 
(3.26) 
-1 
(1.03) 
(-180, - 120) 1 
(3.72) 
-2 
(1.54) 
35** 
(2.66) 
15 
(1.24) 
(-120, -90) -22 
(3.05) 
8 
(1.42) 
-7 
(2.95) 
3 
(0.37) 
(-90, -60) -11 
(2.11) 
3 
(1.09) 
11 
(1.52) 
-1 
(0.18) 
(-60, -30) 0 
(3.05) 
2 
(1.52) 
1 
(1.58) 
0 
(0.55) 
(-30, -20) 14* 
(1.7) 
3 
(1.01) 
-4 
(0.9) 
1 
(0.56) 
(-20, -10) 12 
(1.89) 
9 
(2.12) 
-8 
(1.17) 
1 
(0.23) 
(-10, 0) 8 
(1.69) 
6* 
(0.49) 
-6 
(1.28) 
0 
(0) 
(0, 10) 40*** 
(2.35) 
-6 
(1.42) 
-10* 
(2.75) 
10 
(0.74) 
(10, 20) 18 
(2.13) 
4 
(0.98) 
-14** 
(1.18) 
3 
(0.81) 
(20, 30) 3 
(2.99) 
-3 
(0.65) 
-2 
(0.81) 
1 
(0.71) 
(30, 60) 65*** 
(3.6) 
14 
(2.4) 
10 
(1.57) 
8 
(0.86) 
(60, 90) 56** 
(5.38) 
-9 
(1.03) 
-26 
(2.98) 
2 
(1.3) 
(90, 120) 15* 
(3.25) 
4 
(2.27) 
-6 
(3.92) 
-2 
(0.98) 
(120,  180) -43 
(7.04) 
18* 
(1.94) 
7 
(1.53) 
-2 
(1.7) 
(180,  240) -4 
(2.14) 
-12 
(1.45) 
39 
(2.7) 
10** 
(1.31) 
(240,  270) -13 
(4.93) 
11 
(1.45) 
3 
(1.78) 
-9 
(0.85) 
(270,  300) 5 
(3.36) 
2 
(1.2) 
-6 
(1.66) 
-7 
(0.77) 
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Table 4: Trading profits   
In this table, we follow Erenburg et al (2006) and report per trade profits averaged across all stocks and 
trades on announcement days at time t:  
( )Profit D RP P Qt t t t t  , 
where RPt   is the reference price, Pt  is the trade price, Dt  is an indicator variable equal to one for buys 
and minus one for sells, Qt  is the trade volume.  The reference price is calculated as the average trade 
price during the sixth minute after the announcement. Cum AT (Non-AT) profit is the cumulative profit 
and No. of AT (Non-AT) is the number of trades for AT and non-AT. Difference is the absolute value of 
Cum AT profit – Cum Non-AT profit. The symbols ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% level.  
Interval 
(sec) 
AT 
Profit 
Non-AT 
Profit 
No. of 
AT 
Trades 
No. of  
Non-AT 
Trades 
Cum 
AT 
Profit 
Cum 
Non-AT 
 Profit 
Difference 
 
(-160, -150) 376.74 -616.6 4 4 376.74 -616.60 993.34 
(-150, -140) 78.04 -146.29 5 6 454.79 -762.89 1217.68 
(-140, -130) 12.8 -75.45 5 3 467.59 -838.34 1305.93 
(-130, -120) 0.83 -769.75 5 6 468.42 -1608.09 2076.51 
(-120, -110) 49.87 -153.92 5 4 518.29 -1762.01 2280.30 
(-110, -100) -53.81 -87.65 5 3 464.48 -1849.66 2314.14 
(-100, -90) -13.31 339.33 4 2 451.17 -1510.33 1961.50 
(-90, -80) -27.41 3.25 3 3 423.76 -1507.08 1930.84 
(-80, -70) -96.5 -1303.54 5 5 327.26 -2810.62 3137.88* 
(-70, -60) -264.67 456.87 5 3 62.59 -2353.75 2416.34 
(-60, -50) -268.51 -46.67 5 3 -205.92 -2400.42 2194.50 
(-50, -40) -199.42 -243.64 5 5 -405.34 -2644.06 2238.72 
(-40,  -30) -199.77 -62.31 5 3 -605.11 -2706.37 2101.26 
(-30, -20) 2.97 106.41 5 4 -608.08 -2599.96 1991.88 
(-20, -10) 132.52 216.14 5 3 -475.56 -2559.07 2083.51 
(-10, 0) -221.58 -175.25 5 2 -697.14 -2621.66 1924.52 
(0, 10) 87.96 -62.59 9 5 -609.18 -2832.26 2223.08 
( 10, 20) 173.58 -210.6 7 4 -435.59 -2900.49 2464.9* 
( 20, 30) 347.88 -68.23 5 3 -87.71 -3141.55 3053.84 
( 30, 40) 161.8 -241.06 3 2 74.09 -3291.40 3365.49** 
( 40, 50) 365.9 -149.85 4 3 439.98 -3418.93 3858.91* 
( 50, 60) 232.52 -127.53 4 3 672.50 -4166.38 4838.88 
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Interval 
(sec) 
AT 
Profit 
Non-AT 
Profit 
No. of 
AT 
No. of  
Non-AT 
Cum 
AT 
Cum 
Non-AT 
Difference 
 
( 60, 70) 788.61 -747.45 4 5 1461.11 -3982.94 5444.05 
( 70, 80) 530.25 183.44 8 5 1991.36 -4382.53 6373.89 
( 80, 90) 2178.09 -399.59 7 3 4169.45 -4669.87 8839.32*** 
( 90, 100) 840.27 -287.34 5 4 5009.72 -5220.30 10230.02** 
( 100, 110) 601.95 -550.43 5 3 5611.67 -5691.17 11302.84** 
( 110, 120) 226.75 -470.87 7 4 5838.42 -5941.33 11779.75* 
( 120, 130) 16.74 -250.16 5 5 5855.17 -7139.76 12994.93 
( 130, 140) 62.58 -1198.43 4 4 5917.74 -7359.14 13276.88 
( 140, 150) 9.02 -219.38 5 3 5926.76 -7370.47 13297.23 
( 150, 160) 356.47 -11.33 5 3 6283.23 -2559.07 8842.3 
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Table 5: Empirical analysis of the temporal relation between AT, non-AT and market 
returns  
This table presents the results of a VAR analysis of the associations between AT, non-AT and market 
returns surrounding corporate earnings announcements. The following system of three equations is 
estimated:  
, 0 1 1
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where 
,
algo
i t  is the 30 second imbalance for AT initiated trades and ,i tnonAlgo  is the 30 second imbalance 
for non-AT initiated trades for company i at time t.  Imbalance is calculated as buy volume – sell volume. 
,i treturn  is 30 second return. pre
D
  
is a  dummy variable that equal 1 for the first 300 seconds before the 
announcement and postD  is a dummy variable that equals 1 for the first 300 seconds after the 
announcement. The following control variables are included, 
,i td  
is dummy variable for each company, 
invPrice ,i t  is inverse price and logMCap ,i t  
 is log of market capitalization. F statistics are based on the null 
hypothesis that all company dummy variables are jointly insignificant. Newey-West (1987) standard 
errors are reported in parenthesis. ***, ** and * indicates statistical significance of the coefficients at the 
1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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,i treturn a ,i talgo  ,i tnonAlgo  
Panel A : ( Intercepts ) Pre and post earnings announcement  

 
5720.64 
(3770.23) 
-856.91 
(472.01) 
6460.50 
(9535.10) 
preD  2377.97 
(1281.53) 
-23375.40 
(12237.02) 
-1406.92 
(1340.80) 
postD  3519.04** 
(1140.86) 
7412.49** 
(2265.40) 
2638.333 
(2156.71) 
 
Panel B:  Lagged variables  five minute pre earnings announcement 
1
*
t pre
retu Drn

 156.72** 
(56.10) 
282.96** 
(102.50) 
164.33** 
(59.02) 
2
*
t pre
retu Drn

 98.08 
(69.88) 
185.54 
(107.7) 
144.46* 
(70.42) 
3
*
t pre
retu Drn

 35.98 
(77.05) 
170.86 
(285.64) 
81.82 
(928.90) 
4
*
t pre
retu Drn

 6.31 
(5.39) 
-50.39 
(36.91) 
38.99 
(709.51) 
5
*
t pre
retu Drn

 -2.13 
(51.1) 
-82.69 
(46.27) 
-135.07 
(719.90) 
1
*
ret p
al Dgo

 0.0917** 
(0.0323) 
0.1603*** 
(0.0335) 
0.1479 
(0.147) 
2
*
ret p
al Dgo

 0.0526 
(0.0577) 
0.1512 
(0.1417) 
0.1233 
(0.0898) 
3
*
ret p
al Dgo

 0.0405 
(0.0571) 
0.0895 
(0.1927) 
0.07403 
(0.0651) 
4
*
ret p
al Dgo

 -0.0003 
(0.0007) 
0.0064 
(0.0133) 
0.0329 
(0.032) 
5
*
ret p
al Dgo

 -0.0023 
(0.0061) 
0.0032 
(0.0036) 
-0.0119 
(0.0239) 
1
*
t pre
nonAl Dgo

 0.0442*** 
(0.0073) 
0.0739*** 
(0.0062) 
0.0914*** 
(0.0105) 
2
*
t pre
nonAl Dgo

 0.0219** 
(0.0071) 
0.0356*** 
(0.0065) 
0.0622* 
(0.0314) 
3
*
t pre
nonAl Dgo

 0.0144** 
(0.0056)
0.0269*** 
(0.0061)
0.0181 
(0.0167)
4
*
t pre
nonAl Dgo

 0.0103 
(0.0093) 
0.0168 
(0.0233) 
0.0076 
(0.0116) 
5
*
t pre
nonAl Dgo

 0.0008 
(0.0023) 
0.0067 
(0.0064) 
-0.0442 
(0.0507) 
   (continues) 
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Panel C:  Lagged variables five minute post earnings 
1
*
postt
r rn Detu

 437.00*** 
(118) 
672.67** 
(217.09) 
117.87 
(373.02) 
2
*
postt
r rn Detu

 356.00** 
(122) 
562.32* 
(256.1) 
51.19 
(246.50) 
3
*
postt
r rn Detu

 236.481* 
(107.5) 
353.09 
(216.5) 
47.07 
(345.18) 
4
*
postt
r rn Detu

 184.31 
(236) 
105.87 
(85.78) 
12.72 
(887.03) 
5
*
postt
r rn Detu

 -265 
(462) 
77.30 
(62.83) 
-95.73 
(849.70) 
1
*
p tt os
al Dgo

 0.1447*** 
(0.0003) 
0.5176*** 
(0.0049) 
0.9185*** 
(0.272) 
2
*
p tt os
al Dgo

 0.0887*** 
(0.0241) 
0.2597** 
(0.0091) 
0.5250*** 
(0.0585) 
3
*
p tt os
al Dgo

 0.0739*** 
(0.0062) 
0.0853** 
(0.0279) 
0.2306* 
(0.1125) 
4
*
p tt os
al Dgo

 0.0392 
(0.0409) 
0.0703 
(0.0741) 
0.0827 
(0.0524) 
5
*
p tt os
al Dgo

 0.0041 
(0.0127) 
-0.0012 
(0.0031) 
0.0940 
(0.0585) 
1
*
t post
nonA Dlgo

 0.0125** 
(0.0047) 
0.1259 
(0.1079) 
0.0943 
(0.1024) 
2
*
t post
nonA Dlgo

 0.0072 
(0.0044) 
0.0984 
(0.1098) 
0.0401 
(0.0606) 
3
*
t post
nonA Dlgo

 0.0016 
(0.0034) 
0.0717 
(0.1108) 
0.0366 
(0.0668) 
4
*
t post
nonA Dlgo

 0.0002 
(0.0033) 
0.0361 
(0.1102) 
0.0133 
(0.0108) 
5
*
t post
nonA Dlgo

 -0.0058 
(0.0045) 
0.0138 
(0.1016) 
-0.0908 
(0.0675) 
 
Panel D: Auto-regressive lagged variables during bench mark 
period b 
, 1i t
Return

 66275.80*** 
(10570) 
170.52* 
(84.49) 
146.66* 
(74.61) 
, 2i t
Return

 42153.4*** 
(11450) 
117.39 
(86.2) 
138.36 
(78.21) 
, 3i t
Return

 37682.9*** 
(11110) 
90.22 
(84.2) 
89.33 
(109.1) 
, 4i t
Return

 16549.01 
(13350) 
81.27 
(87.02) 
41.65 
(57.76) 
, 5i t
Return

 5530.10 
(9060) 
46.979 
(116.17) 
-15.38 
(55.49) 
, 1i t
oalg

 0.0268*** 
(0.0061) 
0.525*** 
(0.0585) 
0.0536 
(0.0314) 
, 2i t
oalg

 0.0104** 
(0.0035) 
0.3456*** 
(0.0352) 
0.0120 
(0.0261) 
, 3i t
oalg

 0.0067 
(0.0064) 
0.1603*** 
(0.0335) 
0.0111 
(0.0292) 
, 4i t
oalg

 0.0026 
(0.0035) 
0.0354 
(0.0273) 
-0.0431 
(0.0336) 
, 5i t
oalg

 -0.0032 
(0.0031) 
0.0204 
(0.0243) 
-0.0256 
(0.0167) 
 (continues) 
 
46 
 
    
, 1i t
lgononA

 0.0066*** 
(0.0010) 
0.0062 
(0.0189) 
0.5150*** 
(0.0505) 
, 2i t
lgononA

 0.0023 
(0.0017) 
0.0057 
(0.0128) 
0.1663*** 
(0.0437) 
, 3i t
lgononA

 0.0012 
(0.0008) 
0.0042 
(0.0108) 
0.0636* 
(0.0288) 
, 4i t
lgononA

 -0.0008 
(0.0018) 
-0.0191 
(0.0126) 
0.0086 
(0.050) 
, 5i t
lgononA

 -0.0015 
(0.0018) 
-0.0991 
(0.0515) 
0.0222 
(0.0399) 
Panel E: Control variables 
,i tinvPrice  
-3168.21 
(3770.23) 
-3677.97 
(3373.62) 
-3334.38** 
(1137.93) 
,i tlogMCap  
-968.02 
(4210.01) 
148.84* 
(68.71) 
-770.33 
(1249.21) 
F-Test  ( ,i td ) 4.59*** 6.34*** 4.85*** 
Note (1) a  denotes coefficients for 
,i treturn  equations have been 
enlarged by 105  and (b) Bench mark period is defined as  twenty 
five minute before and after the five minute pre and post Earning 
Announcements.  
 
Table 6: Information share statistics of AT and Non-AT 
This table presents the information share ratio (Hasbrouck, 1995), 30 minutes before and 30 minutes after 
earnings announcement.  The following vector error correction model (VECM) is used: 
1
1
k
t t t i ti
i
p p A p 
 

    
 
where 
t
p   is an vector of cointegrated prices, 
i
A  are n n   matrices of autoregressive coefficients, k  is 
the number of lags, 
1t
p

  is an  vector of error correction terms,   is an  ( 1) 1n    matrix of adjustment 
coefficients, and 
t
  is an  1n   vector of price innovations. The VECM is estimated using log-prices and 
ten lags. 
 AT Non-AT 
 Upper 
bound 
Lower 
Bound 
Midpoint Upper 
bound 
Lower 
Bound 
Midpoint 
Panel A. 30 minutes Pre Earnings Announcement 
Median 44.16% 40.33% 42.25% 59.66% 55.84% 57.75% 
Mean 43.82% 40.75% 42.29% 59.24% 56.18% 57.71% 
St. Error of Mean 16.96% 16.27% 16.62% 16.27% 16.96% 16.62% 
       
Panel B. 30 minutes Post Earnings Announcement 
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Median 67.58% 62.18% 64.88% 40.00% 30.48% 35.24% 
Mean 66.52% 64.70% 65.61% 36.78% 32.05% 34.42% 
St. Error of Mean 18.44% 19.65% 19.05% 18.77% 19.22% 19.00% 
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Figure 1: Cumulative average returns and adjusted cumulative average returns  
Figure 1a presents the cumulative average return (CAR) in a five minutes event-window centered at the 
earnings announcement in 10 second observation intervals. We classify announcements as either good 
news or bad news, using data obtained from the Institutional Brokers Estimate System (IBES). We collect 
quarterly median EPS forecast and the standardize surprise is calculated as follows:   
Actual EPS -Median Forecast EPS
Surprise
Standard deviation [Actual EPS -Median Forecast EPS]
  
If the surprise ratio is greater than (less than) than one standard deviation we classify news as good (bad) 
news. The cumulative average return at time ( 30,30)k    is calculated as follows: ( 30,30)
30
k
j
j
CAR AR



   
. Firstly we calculate , ,i j kR  which is the return for i th firm, j th time position in the window (-30, 30) and 
k th announcements. Secondly we calculate ,i jR  which is the average return for ith firm over the number 
of  Nh  announcements where h=1 for the good news and 2 for bad news. ,i jR  is calculated as follow: 
, , ,
1
1/
hN
i j h i j k
k
R N R

  Thirdly we calculate jAR   that is cross –section aggregation, the average return of 
,i jR  for all firms in the sample. jAR  is calculated as follows: ,
1
1/
hm
j h i j
i
AR m R

  . Figure 1b presents the 
cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs).  The same calculation method is followed, except, 
abnormal return is to replace , ,i j kR  by  , , , , ,i j k i j k j kAR R R   where ,j kR   is the return of ASX 200 index on 
jth time point and k th announcements. The cumulative average abnormal return is calculated as follows: 
( 30,30)
30
k
j
j
CAAR AAR



  .  where  jAAR  is average abnormal returns at the jth time point.  
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